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tion decreases voter turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is
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1 Introduction
“A Californian plans to vote after work in what she believes to be
a close presidential election. (She has little interest in the race for
congressman for her district, although it is closer.) The day is rainy
and as she approaches the polling place she sees a long line. On
the radio she hears that one presidential candidate has a substantial
lead in other states. She says why bother and turns her car around
and drives home.”
Sudman (1986, p. 332)
In August, 2009, exit poll results for key regional elections in Germany were
leaked on Twitter before voting ended. These polls showed that Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s conservative party had much less support than in previous
elections. Wolfgang Bosbach, deputy parliamentary head of Merkel’s Christian
Union bloc, said that the leaked results “damaged democracy” and a spokesman
for the pro-business Free Democrats, Merkel’s preferred coalition partner, com-
mented that the leaks were “unacceptable.” In addition, such reporting is
against the German law with a fine of up to 50,000 euros, so German election of-
ficials immediately began to investigate whether the Twitter messages violated
the law.1 The German case is not unusual: a survey of 66 countries world-
wide finds that of the 59 that permit exit polls during an election, 41 prohibit
publication of the results until after all voting has concluded (see Spangenberg
(2003)).
Yet in recent 21st century elections, incidents similar to the 2009 Twitter
controversy in Germany abound. In 2007, the websites of several Swiss and
Belgium newspapers crashed when French citizens attempted to access exit poll
results during an election and in the 2012 French presidential election, results
were also available online while voting was still in progress.2 Countries with
multiple time zones like France, the United States, Canada or Russia, in which
1See Carter (2009).
2See Sayare (2012).
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voting takes place at different times in different regions face particular difficul-
ties.3 The notorious reporting on Floridian exit poll results in the 2000 United
States presidential election occurred while voters in the western part of the
state and the rest of the nation were still voting. In 2004 leaked US presidential
exit poll results were commonly discussed among voters while east coast voters
were still going to the ballot booths.4 With the proliferation of Twitter, Face-
book, and other social media worldwide, the ability of governments to control
and limit leaked exit polls both inside and outside their countries is becoming
increasingly difficult.
Despite the growing tendency for voters to learn exit polls results while an
election is still ongoing, observational data-based research on the effects of such
information on voting behavior is limited and inconclusive. One possible natural
setting for exploring this issue is the so-called West Coast effect in the U.S.; that
is, the release of early East Coast election returns before the polls close on the
West Coast due to the fact that the presidential election takes place in three
different continental time zones. The debate over this effect emerged in the early
1960s after the introduction of sophisticated computer models, improved survey
techniques for predicting election results, and rapid access to media information.
The first set of related studies, however, which explored the 1964 presidential
election, showed barely any West Coast effect (see for example McAllister and
Studlar (1991)).
A second set of major studies focused on the 1980 election,5 in which pre-
election polls indicated a close election between Reagan and Carter, but Carter
3The United States does not prohibit the reporting of exit poll results, so elections are
often publicly decided before voters in Alaska and Hawaii have voted, and sometimes while
voting in California and other western states is still ongoing. In Canada polls close at the
same time across the country to reduce the potential of leaked results. In India, although the
country is not subject to the same time zone issues, voting is conducted at different times in
different regions for security reasons and reporting early results is illegal.
4See Best and Krueger (2012) for a review.
5It should be noted that other elections between 1964 and 1980 have also been explicitly
analyzed. For example, Tuchman and Coffin (1971) explore the influence of election night
television broadcasts on the close 1968 election but find no evidence that it affected voting.
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conceded defeat even before the polls closed in the west.6 However, although
these researchers used a richer set of data (aggregated data on various elections,
regional, data or congressional districts, or better survey data), they produced
mixed results. For example, Jackson (1983), using a pool of 1981 persons inter-
viewed before and after the election, found some evidence that media coverage
of exit polls in the 1980 U.S. presidential election did lead to a reduction in
turnout. However, the survey data used in his and a number of similar studies
of the 2000 election have been strongly criticized as unreliable (see the review
in Frankovic (2001)7).
Despite this lack of conclusive observational evidence on exit polls’ effects
on subsequent voter choices, however, a few laboratory studies, do suggest that
information about early voting can have significant effects on voter behavior.
These studies indicate that later voters’ choices appear to be influenced by
information about early voting. More specifically, later voters with the same
preferences who have learned early voter choices make different turnout decisions
(see Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007)) or vote for different candidates (see
Hung and Plott (2001), Morton and Williams (1999) and Morton and Williams
(2001)) than they would have done without that information.
If, as the experimental evidence suggests, later voters are indeed so influ-
enced by early voting results, then the advent of increasing social media reports
6NBC was also strongly criticized for declaring Ronald Reagan the President of the United
States at 8:15PM eastern standard time based on its own computer projections: “Articles,
reports, and letters were written describing how voting lines outside polling places disappeared,
how turnout decreased over prior years, and how voters stayed home after it became apparent
that their favored candidates had already won or lost” (Leonardo (1983, p. 297)). Criticism
also emerged that national voter turnout decreased to 53.95% (the rate since 1948, see Dubois
(1983)). All this criticism led to a congressional hearing, journalistic commentary, private
studies, and a task force report, as well as the proposition of remedial bills to regulate either
poll closing times or the timing of network election predictions, but no action was taken once
interest began disappearing (Leonardo (1983), Carpini (1984)).
7Frankovic, Kathleen, “Part Three: Historical Perspective,” in Linda Mason, Kathleen
Frankovic, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, CBS News Coverage of Election Night 2000: Inves-
tigation, Analysis, Recommendations, January 2001.
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of election results through exit polls can lead to fundamental changes in the
way voters behave. It may thus have important consequences for how democ-
racy works in many countries. Most obviously, candidates and political parties
may have incentives to manipulate the reported results in order to seek advan-
tages. But even if the results are accurately reported, other serious effects might
occur. For example, if later voters are less likely to participate or have a ten-
dency to engage in bandwagon voting, then the candidates preferred by earlier
voters may be more likely to win elections. To the extent that the timing of the
voter participation decision is exogenous and depends on voter characteristics
such as income, ethnicity or other factors that arguably affect voter preferences,
then voters may be unequally represented even though their votes are theo-
retically equal. At the same time, to the extent that the timing of voting is
endogenous, candidates and political parties will have an incentive to engage in
strategic manipulation of the factors that influence when individuals choose to
participate, much like the strategic manipulation in the timing of presidential
primaries in the United States.8 Hence, given that the election process is fun-
damentally changing with social media reporting of exit poll results, whether
later voters’ choices are influenced is an important empirical question for many
countries in which such information has historically not been available.9
In this paper, we make use of a unique natural experiment to address the
question whether later voters behavior is affected by exit poll information about
earlier voter choices. Specifically, we exploit a 2005 voting reform in France to
estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon (or
underdog) voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in French west-
ern overseas territories voted after the mainland election results were already
known via exit polls. This reform creates an exogenous variation in information
for a well identified group of voters and provides therefore the setting for a nat-
ural experiment to study the effect of exit poll information on voters behavior.
8See Morton and Williams (1999) for a discussion of these manipulations.
9 Thompson (2004) presents additional normative and philosophical arguments against the
revelation of such information to later voters.
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Such an approach has two advantages. First, relative to existing studies on the
West Coast effect, our natural experimental setting allows us to eliminate lots of
the possible caveats in the analysis of the causal effect of information by provid-
ing a counterfactual situation (same constituencies with and without exit poll
information). Second, our study does not suffer for the possible concern about
the ecological validity of the results, a criticism often raised about laboratory
experiments.
Using this voting reform to study the effect of exit poll information, we
find evidence that the public knowledge about such polls not only decreases
turnout by about 10 percentage points, but also increases bandwagon voting.
We therefore conclude that exit polls can indeed have consequential effects on
voter behavior and that the advent of social media reporting on exit poll in-
formation may fundamentally change the democratic process in many countries
where such information was previously unavailable.
In the next section, we review the relevant theoretical literature on informa-
tion and voting behavior. Section 3 then outlines our empirical research design
and the natural experiment, Section 4 presents our results regarding the effect
on turnout, Section 5 addresses robustness concerns and Section 6 presents the
results on the Bandwagon effect. We conclude and discuss the implications of
our analysis in Section 7.
2 The Role of Exit Poll Information in Voting
Choices: Theory and Experimental Evidence
When individuals know the results from earlier voting as in leaked exit polls,
voting becomes sequential in nature. In the case of complete information about
the choices before voters but incomplete information about other participants’
preferences, learning the results of earlier decisions simply provides later par-
ticipants with information about the likelihood that their vote may be pivotal.
It is thus straightforward to show that if voting is costly (even if the costs are
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minimal), learning that one’s own decision will not affect the outcome implies
that a rational individual should abstain. If however, a voter learns instead that
the election is extremely close and the probability of being pivotal is high, then
later voters may actually participate at greater rates than they would if voting
were simultaneous and they had less precise information about other voter’s
choices.
If voters have private information about the choices before them in an elec-
tion, then early voting results not only reveal the extent to which individual
choice may be pivotal but may also provide later voters with insights into the
information held by early voters about the choices. As shown by Battaglini
(2005), when voting is costly the set of equilibria in sequential private infor-
mation voting games are disjoint from those in which voting is simultaneous.
That is, later voters’ choices will be influenced by the results of early voting.
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007) also find support for these qualitative
theoretical predictions in laboratory elections using a three-voter game; in par-
ticular, they find significant evidence of strategic abstention by later voters.
Other results, however, are at variance with theory – they find that early voters
tend to participate more than theoretically predicted, whereas later voters ab-
stain more, sometimes even when their votes could be pivotal. They conclude
that, as predicted, although sequential voting tends to be more informationally
and economically efficient than simultaneous voting, later voters benefit at the
expense of early voters, so there is a cost in terms of equity. Nevertheless, they
find no evidence of later voters ignoring their private information and engaging
in bandwagon or underdog voting.
Callander (2007) considers the comparison of simultaneous and sequential
voting under asymmetric information when voters receive utility from conform-
ing to the majority (voting for the winner) independent of the utility they de-
rive from whether the winner is their own best choice. Specifically, he derives
an equilibrium under sequential voting in which voters engage in bandwagon
voting (voting for the leading candidate) even though their private information
may suggest that the leading candidate is not their own best choice. He finds
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that such bandwagon voting may occur even when later voters’ choices are not
pivotal and the outcome is already decided (because of the additional utility
voters receive from the act of voting for the winning candidate). This argument
is supported by earlier work by Hung and Plott (2001), which provides experi-
mental evidence of conformity voting when subjects are rewarded for doing so.
Presumably, if voters similarly receive utility from voting for an underdog can-
didate (or are rewarded for doing so in an experiment), then later voters may
also engage in underdog voting even when they previously believed the leading
candidate to be their own best choice.
Hence, both theory and the experimental evidence suggests that if the act
of voting is costly, when later voters learn from exit poll information that their
decision is unlikely to be pivotal, they are more likely to abstain. If, however,
they receive utility from the act of voting for either the winner or the underdog
(independent of whether the winner is their own best choice), then such exit poll
information may lead them to engage in either bandwagon or underdog voting,
respectively.
Our natural experiment allows us to evaluate the extent to which exit poll
information affects the turnout of later voters and whether later voters are more
likely to engage in either bandwagon or underdog voting.
3 The Natural Experiment: Institutional Back-
ground and Empirical Strategy
3.1 The French Electoral System
France is one of the few countries in Europe to have a presidential system.
The French president is directly elected by the citizens via a two-round runoff
system. In the first round a large number of candidates can participate.10
If one candidate receives more than 50% of the votes in the first round he
10To be eligible to run, a candidate must gather 500 signatures from local politicians such
as town councilors.
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or she is declared the winner. Such an immediate victory, however, has only
happened once since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, in 1958.11 Usually,
the two candidates that receive the most votes participate in a second round to
determine the winner.
This two-round runoff system model is also used in most other elections in
France with some variation. The French parliamentary elections differ slightly
in the sense that the two-round runoff elections within each constituency allow
more than two candidates to participate in the second round.12 In practice,
however, although a few second rounds are disputed by three candidates, most
involve only two.
Balloting traditionally takes place on a Sunday. French electoral law pro-
hibits exit poll publication until the close of voting in mainland France (Bale
(2002)) and bans publication, broadcasting and commenting on opinion polls
for the day before and the day of the election (Saturday and Sunday). The
electoral law also stipulates that the official campaign has to stop for these last
two days.13
When a French presidential election is held, it is always the only contest on
the ballot, which stands in contrast to, for example, U.S. elections, in which bal-
lots include local, congressional and senatorial posts, and even local propositions
and initiatives. The French case thus allows us to measure turnout for presi-
dential elections only, meaning that the turnout measured is not confounded by
effects from other elections.
During the day of the election, the release of exit polls is therefore not allowed
11This presidential election was the first one of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle had overseen
the design of the new constitution and was seen as having saved France from a potential
military coup by the many army generals opposed to the process of Algerian independence.
In these dramatic circumstances, De Gaulle won the election with more than 78% of the votes.
12In order to participate in the second round, candidates must gather a minimum proportion
of registered voters in the constituency, currently 12.5%. In presidential elections, however,
there are always exactly two candidates in the second round.
13The law was initially voted in in 1977. At that time, the publication and broadcasting
of opinion polls were banned for one week before each of the two rounds of voting. It was
changed in 2002 to limit this interdiction to the last two days before the results.
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until after the closure of the last polling booth in mainland France, on Sunday
at 8:00PM CET.14 At exactly 8:00PM, TV channels release highly precise early
estimations of the final results. These are based on large exit polls and on the
first results from the majority of polling booths, which close at 6:00PM.15
To demonstrate the quality of these early estimates, we collected the 8:00PM
CET forecasts for each candidate from the main public channel (France 2) at
every election in our sample. Table 1 lists these forecasts, together with the
actual results and the differences between the two. In the second round of
the 1981 election, for example, the difference between the final result and the
8:00PM predictions is the same for both the first candidate and the runner-
up at 0.06 percentage points, with the forecasted difference between the two
candidates at 3.4% and the actual difference at 3.52%. As Table 1 clearly
shows, exit poll forecasts are extremely accurate, the final ranking is always the
one predicted by the forecast and the vote shares are most often similar to a
few decimal points.
14Central European time (CET) is used in most parts of the European Union and is one
hour ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Polling booths in main urban areas close
at 8:00PM while most polling booths in the countryside close at 6:00PM.
15Given that all votes are aggregated at the national level, the law of large numbers helps
these estimations to be precise. Unlike the case in the UK or U.S., the result does not depend
on some swing constituencies/states from which the final result can take time to emerge. In
fact, the final difference between early estimations and the final official results is typically less
than 0.3 percentage points for any given candidate, see Table 1.
10
F
ir
st
ca
n
d
id
at
e
S
ec
o
n
d
ca
n
d
id
a
te
T
h
ir
d
ca
n
d
id
a
te
D
iff
p
iv
o
ta
l
ca
n
d
id
a
te
s
Y
ea
r
R
ou
n
d
F
or
ec
as
t
R
es
u
lt
D
iff
F
o
re
ca
st
R
es
u
lt
D
iff
F
o
re
ca
st
R
es
u
lt
D
iff
F
o
re
ca
st
R
es
u
lt
D
iff
19
81
1
28
.3
28
.3
2
-0
.0
2
2
5
.2
2
5
.8
5
-0
.6
5
1
7
.9
1
8
-0
.1
7
.3
7
.8
5
0
.5
5
2
51
.7
51
.7
6
-0
.0
6
4
8
.3
4
8
.2
4
0
.0
6
-
-
-
3
.4
3
.5
2
0
.1
2
19
88
1
34
.4
34
.1
0
.3
0
1
9
.5
1
9
.9
4
-0
.4
4
1
6
.5
1
6
.5
5
-0
.0
5
3
3
.3
9
0
.3
9
2
53
.9
54
.0
2
-0
.1
2
4
6
.1
4
5
.9
8
0
.1
2
-
-
-
7
.8
8
.0
4
0
.2
4
19
95
1
23
.4
23
.3
0
.1
2
0
2
0
.8
4
-0
.8
4
1
8
.5
1
8
.5
8
-0
.0
8
1
.5
2
.2
6
0
.7
6
2
52
52
.6
4
-0
.6
4
4
8
4
7
.3
6
0
.6
4
-
-
-
4
5
.2
8
1
.2
8
20
02
1
20
19
.8
8
0
.1
2
1
1
7
1
6
.8
6
0
.1
4
1
6
1
6
.1
8
-0
.1
8
1
0
.6
8
-0
.3
2
2
82
.1
82
.2
1
-0
.1
1
1
7
.9
1
7
.7
9
0
.1
1
-
-
-
6
4
.2
6
4
.4
2
0
.2
2
20
07
1
29
.6
31
.1
8
-1
.5
8
2
5
.1
2
5
.8
7
-0
.7
7
1
8
.7
1
8
.5
7
0
.1
3
6
.4
7
.3
0
.9
0
2
53
53
.0
6
-0
.0
6
4
7
4
6
.9
4
0
.0
6
-
-
-
6
6
.1
2
0
.1
2
20
12
1
28
.4
28
.6
3
-0
.2
3
2
5
.5
2
7
.1
8
-1
.6
8
2
0
1
7
.9
2
.1
5
.5
9
.2
8
3
.7
8
2
51
.9
51
.6
4
0
.2
6
4
8
.1
4
8
.3
6
-0
.2
6
-
-
-
3
.8
0
3
.2
8
-0
.5
2
T
ab
le
1:
F
or
ec
as
ts
as
p
re
se
n
te
d
b
y
F
ra
n
ce
’s
m
a
in
p
u
b
li
c
T
V
ch
a
n
n
el
F
ra
n
ce
2
a
t
8
:0
0
P
M
.
A
ll
n
u
m
b
er
s
a
re
in
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
ts
.
“P
iv
ot
al
ca
n
d
id
at
es
”
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
fi
rs
t
a
n
d
se
co
n
d
ca
n
d
id
a
te
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
ro
u
n
d
a
n
d
th
e
se
co
n
d
a
n
d
th
e
th
ir
d
ca
n
d
id
a
te
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
u
n
d
.
11
Figure 1: France and its overseas territories, taken from Wikipedia.com.
3.2 The 2005 Electoral Reform
Figure 1 provides a map of France and its overseas territories (hereafter OST or
DOM-TOM), which are spread across the globe with time differences ranging
from +12 hours UTC16 (Wallis and Futuna) to −10 hours UTC (French Polyne-
sia). People living in the OST are fully fledged citizens of the French Republic
and therefore participate in the French presidential election in the same way as
French citizens on the mainland.17
Before 2005, French elections were held on Sundays in every territory (main-
land and OSTs), meaning that they began in the most eastern parts, New
16Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) is the international time standard. It closely resem-
bles the “Greenwich Mean Time” with the latter being outdated.
17The OST are divided in two categories: overseas departments (DOM) whose laws are
identical to mainland France, and overseas territories (TOM) which are granted sufficient
autonomy for local laws to differ from mainland France. French OST status and its relationship
with mainland France changes from time to time. For example, New Caledonia is an overseas
territory that is expected to vote on an independence referendum over the next few years.
Conversely, Mayotte, an island in the Comoros archipelagos, recently voted by referendum to
abandon TOM status and become a DOM, making it a new French department with the same
laws and regulations as mainland France.
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Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and then moved progressively across the more
westerly territories as the opening time for polling booths arrived (typically be-
tween 8:00AM and 9:00AM). As a result, the territories located to the west of
the French mainland (e.g. the Caribbean, Guiana) and in the Pacific (French
Polynesia) voted partially or completely after mainland France.
Because the mainland accounts for approximately 96% of the total French
population,18 in national ballots like presidential elections, the result on the
mainland almost certainly determines the overall election result. This setting
is therefore different from that of the U.S., where the number of electoral votes
determined by California can empirically decide the outcome of a close contest.
Table 1 shows that in most cases the result is fully determined once the
mainland results are known. Voters in overseas territories west of mainland
France only represent around 1.5% of the French electorate. The predicted
difference between the two “pivotal candidates” (the first versus the runner-up
in the second round and the second versus the third candidate in the first round)
given by exit polls is almost always below 1.5%.
To illustrate this point further, Table 2 shows the number of votes by which
the runner-up was ahead of the third candidate in mainland France in the first
round and the voting edge of the first versus the second candidate in the second
round, respectively. It also gives the number of registered voters in the western
OSTs and the corresponding difference between both measures for each election
in our sample. As is apparent, in only two elections would it have been math-
ematically possible for the western OST to make a difference: the first rounds
of 1995 and 2002. In 1995, the difference is so large that changing the result
would have required at least 95% of the registered voters in the west to vote for
the third candidate and the remaining 5% not to vote for the second candidate.
Such a scenario seems extremely unlikely. Moreover, in this election, both can-
didates were moderate conservatives, giving limited incentives for voters to try
and change the outcome. The case is somewhat different, however, for the first
round of 2002. Here if the difference between the second and third candidates
182.7 million citizens in the OST versus 63.1 million in mainland France.
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Year Round Voting Edge on the Registered Voters in the Difference
mainland Western OST
1981 1 2,293 470 1,822
2 1, 247 470 776
1988 1 995 556 439
2 2, 405 556 1, 849
1995 1 644 675 −30
2 1, 486 675 810
2002 1 254 756 −502
2 19, 605 754 18, 851
2007 1 2, 520 826 1, 694
2 2, 200 826 1, 374
2012 1 3, 232 869 2, 363
2 1, 027 870 157
Table 2: Vote differences between the two pivotal candidates (2nd versus 3rd
in first round, 1st versus 2nd in second round) on the mainland and in the east
compared to the number of registered voters in the western OST. Numbers are
in 1, 000 votes.
in OST voting was approximately 33% of registered voters, then the outcome
of the election would be affected by choices made in the OST. Although such
a figure still seems quite unlikely, it is at least not completely impossible with
evident consequences for voter turnout. In Section 5, therefore, we conduct
robustness checks to show that our estimates remain unchanged by this event.
As a result of this geographical distribution, before 2005 voters in the ter-
ritories to the west of mainland France had access to information about the
presidential election results while voting booths were still open, while French
Polynesia and the territories off the American continent had precise informa-
tion on election results by 9:00AM and 2:00PM, respectively. Hence, most
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voters probably knew who would win the election before voting. In fact, in
2002, the defeated presidential candidate Lionel Jospin resigned from his office
before people in the western OST had even voted.
This situation was in conflict with the country’s tradition of ensuring that
voting days are free of campaigning and polls in order to allow every citizen to
vote with the same information. Hence, in 2005, the voting order was changed.
All the territories to the west of mainland France had their voting day changed
to Saturday and became the first, instead of the last, territories to vote. The ter-
ritories affected by this change were French Polynesia, St. Pierre and Miquelon,
Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Martinique.
3.3 Other Reforms and Relevant Events
Any analysis of the effect of a policy change over a given period needs to ensure
that the observed changes in the variable of interest cannot be explained by
other policy changes or events happening during the same period. In our case,
four potentially relevant events happened over the period studied that warrant
discussion. First, in 2002, the duration of the presidential mandate was reduced
from seven to five years, which may have affected the overall turnout at the
national level. There seems to be no reason, however, why it should affect
turnout differently in the OST relative to the mainland, and it is a priori even
less likely that it would affect turnout differently in the OST to the west and
east of mainland France.
Second, 2002 saw the first candidate from an OST (Guiana) participating
in the first round of the presidential election, which could have led to a higher
turnout in Guiana in this specific election. We control for this concern by
including a dummy variable indicating Guiana in the first round of 2002 in the
estimations (see Section 5.1).
Third, 2002 was also the first year in which a candidate from the far-right
reached the second round, a totally unexpected event that created a political
shock in the country. As the majority of the population in the overseas territories
15
are not ethnically White, they are likely to be averse to this party’s political
objectives. We address this concern more closely in Section 5.2; we find no
empirical evidence that this event affects our conclusions.
Finally, the last decade has seen the growth of the Internet, making access
to information easier. Hence, in practice, early estimations of the election re-
sults are produced by polling companies as early as 5:00PM CET on the day of
the election. In the 1980s, the laws preventing publication of early polls were
easy to uphold because the only media able to report such early results would
be punished severely for doing so. More recently, however, Belgian and Swiss
newspapers have begun posting early estimations on their websites during elec-
tion day but as they are based outside of France, even though French speaking,
they are not bound to respect French electoral law. Unlike the early 2000s when
access to the Internet was limited, by the 2007 and 2012 elections the spread of
online election result information after 5:00PM had grown substantially, leading
to a debate about the usefulness of a law which could be barely enforced. We
allow for nonlinear time trends in our estimations to control for such changes
over time.
3.4 Data
Our primary data set comprises French presidential election results, especially
turnout for first and second election rounds from 1981 onwards (1981, 1988,
1995, 2002, 2007, and 2012).19 Although we organize the data at the depart-
mental level to make group sizes as comparable as possible, the population sizes
still vary from around 4, 000 in St. Pierre and Miquelon to about 1.8 mil-
lion in the Nord department. The OST each serve as one subdivision in the
19The data were collected from the French ministry of Internal Affairs and from the
www.politiquemania.com website, which provides easily accessible information about French
elections at the local level. Given the large amount of information to be retrieved, it was
impossible to make use of official French ministry data that are not downloadable. We did,
however, compare random samples from the data we received with the official numbers and
found that in every case they were exactly the same.
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analysis.20 There are four OST subdivisions in the east and five in the west,
which in addition to the 96 departments on the mainland comprise a total of
105 such subdivisions in France. The subdivisions we refer to as “treated” are
French Polynesia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and
Martinique.21
In order to conduct robustness checks, we use similar data from French
parliamentary elections, taken directly from the French Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which are also arranged on the departmental level and span a period
from 1997 to 2012. In parliamentary elections - unlike presidential elections -
voters elect representatives in their local constituencies, independent from the
results of mainland voting. Although the overall outcome of the parliamentary
elections is in most cases decided on mainland France, the uncertainty about
the identity of the local MP has not yet been resolved when voters in the OST
vote. Hence, if the 2005 reform has a causal effect on voting behavior in the
OST to the west of mainland France, this effect should be primarily evident in
presidential elections and less so in parliamentary elections. In fact we do not
find any significant effect on turnout in parliamentary elections, which increases
confidence that we actually identify the causal parameter of interest (see Section
5).
3.5 Empirical Strategy
To assess the impact of knowing the election outcome on voter turnout, we
estimate equations of the following form
Yst = α+ ηt+ δ1[t≥2005] + λ1[s∈TG] + β1[t≥2005]1[s∈TG] + γXst + εst , (1)
20For simplicity, we consider both TOMs and DOMs to be geographical units similar to
French departments even if, formally, only DOMs are “departments”.
21Saint Martin and Saint Barthelemy split from Guadeloupe in 2007 to become separate
OST. We nevertheless count their results and population in the 2012 elections jointly with
Guadeloupe to be consistent over the whole sample. The population of these two territories
combined represents 8.5% of the Guadeloupe population.
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where TG indicates the treated OST (i.e. the OST to the west of mainland
France) and Yst the turnout by subdivision s in year t. 1[.] represents the indi-
cator function and X a vector of controls; β, the coefficient on the interaction
of the treatment group and the time dummy, is the difference-in-difference esti-
mator (DID) of the causal effect of interest. As controls we use time trends, a
dummy indicating second round elections and a dummy for OST.
Although splitting up the French mainland into departments helps to mit-
igate concerns about the differing sizes of the underlying voting populations
for each observation, these differences might still be an issue in our analysis.
To tackle this concern, we apply weighted least squares to equation (1) using
the number of registered voters in each department as weights. Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004) also show that standard errors in DID frameworks that
rely on long time series are susceptible to autocorrelation, which might lead to
overconfidence in the precision of the point estimates. To assess the reliability
of our standard error estimates, therefore, we also implement two procedures
suggested to work well in this situation. First, we block bootstrap standard
errors on the department level and second, we collapse the sample into a pre-
and post-period.
Finally, we estimate specifications that allow for different trends in turnout
in different geographical areas of France. Specifically, we define three geograph-
ical areas: mainland France and the eastern and western OST, which we de-
note by g ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We estimate separate linear and quadratic time trends
for each of these territories, which is sometimes labeled as a “random trend
model” (Wooldridge (2001, p. 315)) and basically boils down to a difference-in-
difference-in-difference type approach where previous periods are used as pre-
program tests. Empirically, this approach implies that we replace ηt in equation
(1) by ηgt and ηgt
2. Allowing the different territories to be on different time
trends over the whole sample period is an effective tool for examining whether
the treatment effect we estimate in fact only captures different trajectories of
turnout for the three territories. As it turns out the results are very similar to
the simple DID–model.
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4 Results
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of presidential election turnout averaged by
year for all three territories – the mainland and the western and eastern OST.22
Here, turnout trends seem to be reasonably parallel before the legislative change,
and the increase in turnout is visibly larger in the treated OST between the 2002
and 2007 elections. In 2007, however, there is a distinct increase in turnout in all
parts of France, after which, the time trends again seem to follow a parallel path.
Two factors could potentially have contributed to this surge. First, the 2002
election was marked by the unexpected first-round elimination of the moderate
left candidate in favor of the candidate from the far right party (Section 3.3 for
a discussion). This outcome led to intense public discussion on the importance
of voting by those who feared the far right could do as well again. Second,
the 2007 election saw two polarizing candidates: Segolene Royal and Nicolas
Sarkozy, which could also have driven up turnout. Besides showing a jump in
2007 for all three territories, Figure 2 also clearly shows that turnout in the
western OST increased more relative to the other territories in the west.
Table 3 displays the results of the baseline DID estimates and the random
trend model (in columns (6)-(9)). In the baseline DID regressions, the point esti-
mate is stable around 6.3 percentage points and significantly different from zero
across all specifications and the standard errors are almost unaffected by clus-
tering (columns (3) to (9)), implying that knowing the election results decreases
turnout by about 6 percentage points. In columns (6) and (7) we estimate the
basic random trend models and find that the point estimates increase somewhat
to 9 and 11 percentage points respectively. In columns (8) and (9) we estimate
the same territory-specific trend model using the size of the population in the
departments as weights. Doing so again results in slight increases in the treat-
ment coefficient to about 12 to 14 percentage points. Our preferred specification
is column (9) which includes territory specific linear and quadratic time trends,
a dummy indicating the election round and weighting. Here we estimate a treat-
22Hence turnout is also averaged over the two rounds by territory g, and year.
19
Figure 2: Average Turnout by Geographical Area and Year. The vertical line
indicates the year in which the law change occurred.
ment effect of almost 12 percentage points with a robust standard error of 1.7
percentage points.
Table 4 reports additional results, including the weighted baseline DID and
some efforts to assess the reliability of our standard error estimates. After we
introduce weighting into the baseline DID, the point estimates indicate that
not knowing the election result increases turnout by about 10 percentage points
(see columns (1)–(3) in Table 4). Additionally, in columns (4) and (5) we block-
bootstrap standard errors on the department level and note that they increase
from slightly below 2 to about 2.7 percentage points. In the remaining columns
we calculate the DID estimates on a sample that is collapsed into a pre- and
post-treatment period, which produces similar point estimates of about 7 to 10
percentage points, depending on whether we weight the regression (see Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)). The (clustered) standard errors are similar
to the block-bootstrapped ones. In all specifications the effect is significantly
different from zero.23
23We also implemented Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) quasi-maximum likelihood estimator
in order to account for the fact that the dependent variable is naturally restricted to the unit
20
In sum, in all specifications, the point estimate remains remarkably stable
and quite precisely estimated. For our preferred specification, we report an in-
crease in turnout from not knowing the election result of 12 percentage points.
Moreover, concerns about autocorrelation and different population sizes under-
lying each observation do not seem to matter.
interval. In this approach the conditional mean of the dependent variable is specified as a logit
function and the log likelihood as Bernoulli distributed. Since the Bernoulli likelihood is part
of the linear exponential function family, a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator is consistent
even when the Bernoulli distribution is misspecified. This result goes back to Gourieroux,
Monfort, and Trognon (1984). We cluster the standard errors in all cases on the department
level and find that the results are very much in line with earlier findings: not knowing the
election results has a significant positive impact on turnout.
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5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Pseudo-estimates and the Candidate from French Guiana
In order to check for robustness, we first calculate pseudo DID estimates us-
ing 1994 as the year in which reform was implemented (excluding post–2005
observations)24 and secondly (falsely) using the eastern OST as a treatment
group (on the full sample). In neither case do we find any significant coefficient
estimate (and hence the results are not reported here).
The first-time appearance in the first round of the 2002 election of a candi-
date from French Guiana might have led to an overly increased turnout in this
subdivision. As a consequence, our estimates might be biased since Guiana is
one of the treated territories. As the 2002 election is before the 2005 reform,
this bias would create a downward bias on the estimated effect of the reform on
the change in turnout. Given that we observe an increase in turnout following
the reform, the existence of a Guiana candidate in 2002 can only make our es-
timate conservative (meaning that the effect of exit poll information can only
be higher than the one estimated and not lower). In any case, we control for a
possible bias due to this event by including a dummy indicating Guiana in the
first round of 2002. As expected, we find a positive and significant coefficient on
this dummy. Nevertheless, all results from Table 3 remain literally unchanged
(and are thus not reported here), indicating that this event has no impact on
our estimates.
5.2 “Le Pen Elections”
In Section 3.3, we expressed concern that the anomalous result in the first
round of 2002 - in which right-wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen surprisingly
made it into the second round - might have impacted our results. First, we
24We prefer not to conduct this test on a sample that overlaps with 2005 since in this case
the treatment effect might potentially affect the pseudo-estimate. On the other hand, we only
observe four elections at two time points after the law changed. Hence it seems reasonable to
split the pre-treatment period into half and run this same test on that sample.
24
argue that this event is likely to downward bias our estimates, meaning that
we are presumably estimating lower bounds of the actual effect of knowing the
exit polls on turnout. Such is the case because the closeness of the election
is likely to increase turnout more in the west, which on average has better
information when voting, than in the eastern parts of France. As a result, the
DID estimates tend to be smaller than in the counterfactual case without this
highly polarizing candidate. Second, we replicate the regressions from Tables
3 and 4 excluding the first round of 2002 (see Tables 5 and 6). Reassuringly,
these estimates are very much in line with those using the entire sample. In
the baseline specifications, we find an increase in turnout of around 6%, and as
before, most controls seem to have no large effect on the results.
Once we allow for common linear and quadratic time trends, however, the
effect on turnout increases slightly to about 10% (columns (6) and (7) in Ta-
ble 5), and it increases even more, to about 14%, when we run the regressions
weighted by the number of registered voters in each department (columns (8)
and (9) in the same table). The precision of our estimates also seems mostly
unaffected by the smaller sample size and whether we use OLS, clustered (at
the department level) or block-bootstrapped (columns (4) and (5) in Table 6)
standard errors. In columns (6) to (9) of Table 6, we again use a sample that
is collapsed into pre- and post- treatment periods and find similar point esti-
mates - between 6% and 10%, respectively – depending on whether or not we
use weighting. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that the results
reported earlier are reliable and not biased by unusual events such as the Le
Pen election.
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5.3 Testing for Territory Specific Shocks on Turnout
A threat to the validity of our difference-in-difference estimates is differing time
paths for turnout in the territories versus the mainland in the absence of treat-
ment. We can credibly test for this concern by allowing for different linear and
quadratic time trends for the three territories (see Table 3). In our case, it is even
possible to go one step further by using turnout data on parliamentary elections
in France to re-estimate the same difference-in-difference models as in Section
3.5. Although these elections are national we would expect no treatment effect
because in each subdivision voters choose between different candidates who are
seeking the position as their local representative. Therefore, the result on the
mainland does not influence who will represent an OST district in the national
parliament.25 We can therefore test for territory-specific turnout shocks that
could potentially confound our estimates because such shocks, if they exist, are
likely to also affect other elections. While directly testing for these concerns is
essentially infeasible in DID models, our unique setting allows for this possibility.
Table 7, which summarizes the results using the parliamentary data, shows
similar standard errors but much smaller coefficient estimates. Hence, given
that no estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%
level and all are also much lower in absolute terms, OST-specific shocks do not
seem to be a concern. This finding assures us that we are indeed identifying the
causal effect of interest and not other time-variant shocks. As in Section 3.5, we
also introduce weighting but again find no significant point estimates. Figure 3
summarizes the turnout trends at these parliamentary elections by territory.
25It might be the case that voters in the OST care whether their local representative is a
member of a party of influence in the parliament and in that case results in the mainland may
affect their voting behavior. We assume that these concerns, if they exist, are not large.
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No Common Time Trends Linear and Quadratic Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
OST dummy No No Yes No Yes Yes
Round Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighting No No No No No Yes
SEs OLS Clustered Clustered OLS Clustered Clustered
N 838 838 838 838 838 838
Table 7: Pseudo difference-in-difference estimates analogous to earlier tables
before with parliamentary election turnout as the dependent variable. Standard
errors are given in brackets below. The sample includes parliamentary elections
from 1997 to 2012. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
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Figure 3: Average turnout by territory and year for the parliamentary elec-
tions. The vertical line indicates the year in which the law changed. No over-
proportional increase in turnout is apparent in the western OST.
6 Estimating Potential Bandwagon Effects
In political science, the “bandwagon effect” refers to the phenomena where
people might vote for a candidate just because he or she is likely to win the
election.26 Although this effect attracted lots of attention among scholars, it
turned out to be quite difficult to provide empirical evidence. An opposite effect,
the “underdog” effect, where voters tend to favor the disadvantaged candidate,
26For a discussion of the psychological aspects of a bandwagon effect or impersonal influ-
ence, see, for example Kenney and Rice (1994) or Mutz (1997). Information can also affect
confidence in a voting decision (Matsusaka (1995)). An electoral momentum has also been
found in early presidential primaries (candidates performing well in Iowa or New Hampshire
receive a future primary voter boost, as discussed in Morton and Williams (1999) and Morton
and Williams (2001)). As reviewed previously, Callander (2007) provides a formal model of
bandwagon voting. See also the experimental evidence of bandwagon voting in Hung and
Plott (2001). Schmitt-Beck (1996) also refers to consensus heuristic. If a multitude of voters
are behind one of the candidates, people take the choice of others as an indicator of political
quality of the candidate.
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has also been discussed as a possibility.27
The French natural experiment, however, provides a unique setting for ex-
amining such effects in that prior to the 2005 reform, voters in the western OST
knew the winner when they went to the polls. Our identification strategy thus
relies on estimating the impact of the leading presidential candidate’s voting
edge, as compared to that of the runner-up on the mainland (and in the eastern
OST), on the vote difference in the western OST. To determine this impact, we
estimate the following equation
∆s,t = α+ β∆mainland,t + γ1[t>2005] + δ∆mainland,t ∗ 1[t>2005] + εs,t, (2)
where ∆mainland,t ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized difference of votes between the can-
didate with the most votes and the runner–up at time t on the mainland (and
in the eastern OST) and ∆s,t ∈ [−1, 1] is the same difference in the western
departments at time t. We use only the vote difference in the western OST as
the left-hand variable in this estimation since the non-treated departments con-
tribute to ∆mainland,t. Our approach minimizes endogeneity concerns because
the regressors are predetermined. 1[.] once again denotes the indicator function.
Essentially, equation (2) estimates a pre- and post-2005 slope, in which the pa-
rameter of interest, δ, indicates the difference between both coefficients. This
approach allows us to test for a bandwagon effect using simple t-tests on δ. If
such an effect exists, we would expect δ to be significantly different from zero. A
negative δ would indicate that the results in west OSTs are less correlated with
mainland results after the reform (without exit poll information) than before
the reform (with exit poll information). Thus a negative parameter indicates a
bandwagon effect, where voters in western OST tended to follow the announced
mainland results before the reform. On the contrary, a positive δ indicates an
underdog effect with western OST voters voting less for the mainland favourite
27West (1991, p.153) discusses the case of Walter Mondale and Gary Hart in the 1984 US
presidential nominating process to illustrate the underdog effect. Mondale had a lead over
Hart. Hart then applied the strategy of “do not let the powerbrokers tell you the race is over.”
This strategy helped Hart to attract substantial amount of voter support, losing at the end
but performing much better than anticipated.
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before the reform than after.
Our estimates are summarized in Table 8. We estimate equation (2) via
OLS and find a pre- treatment slope coefficient of 1.17, which is statistically
significant different from zero at the 1% level. We also find a large negative
slope coefficient of −4.05 for the post-2005 period. The difference δ between
both coefficients is therefore negative (−5.22) and statistically significant at the
10% level using ordinary clustered, and bootstrapped standard error estimates
(middle of Table 8) in the t-test. We also conduct a test of the equality of the
pre- and post-2005 slope coefficients (bottom of Table 8), which rejects equality
at the 1% level. Both coefficients, when taken alone, are statistically different
from zero, indicating that the positive relation when voters know who will win
turns negative after the law changes.
We also estimate the same equation excluding observations where the vote
edge from the mainland was larger than 20 percentage points (first round of
1988 and second round of 2002). Visual inspection of the raw data suggests
that these observations could be driving our estimates. Nevertheless, the last
column of Table 8 shows that such outlier observations are not a problem. The
point estimates and standard errors increase somewhat but all estimates are still
significant in all cases. Figure 4, which plots the fitted and raw ∆treated,st versus
∆mainland,t relation separately before and after 2005, confirms this conclusion
graphically.
Overall, these results clearly suggest that election results in western OSTs
were more positively correlated with the mainland results before the reform
when western OST voters could find out the winner in mainland results before
voting. In practice, the candidate ahead in mainland France was more likely to
win in western OSTs before the reform (when voters had access to information
on the identity of the leader on the mainland) than after the reform (when voters
no longer had access to such information). To our knowledge, the evidence we
have provided is the best from the field so far which demonstrates the existence
of a bandwagon effect.
32
Full Sample Excluding Outliers
Pre-2005 slope estimate 1.18∗∗∗ 7.45
(0.29) (4.71)
Post-2005 slope estimate −4.04∗ −4.04
(2.89) (3.07)
Difference δ −5.22 -11.49
Corresponding standard errors:
OLS (2.91)∗ (5.62)∗∗
Clustered by department (2.04)∗ (3.78)∗∗
Bootstrapped (1.23)∗∗∗ (5.76)∗∗
Block bootstrapped by department (1.73)∗∗∗ (3.31)∗∗∗
χ2 test of equality χ2 = 16.57∗∗∗ χ2 = 3.74∗
P value < 0.01 0.053
N 60 50
Table 8: Estimating equation (2) with ∆treated,st as the dependent variable.
Several standard error estimates are given for the t-test of H0 : the difference
in pre- and post-2005 slopes is zero. *,** and *** indicate significance for this
t-test at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
33
Figure 4: Plot of ∆mainland versus ∆treated, separately before and after 2005 for
the sample without outliers. The former exhibits a clear positive trend and the
latter a distinct negative one indicating, that, ceteris paribus, the leading candi-
date on the mainland loses votes when these voters have no exit poll information
from the mainland.
7 Concluding Remarks
The advent and proliferation of new electronic information sources and social
media has had profound impacts on many aspects of politics across the globe.
Increasingly, individuals are able to us the web to coordinate protests against
governments and other groups, acquire secret and classified information, and
to monitor exit poll results while an election is still in process. In this paper
we investigate the possible effects of the last development on political behavior.
Previous research using naturally occurring elections has suffered from a number
of methodological problems in identifying whether such information can have a
causal effect on voting behavior.
We take advantage of a unique natural experiment from 2005, in which
French citizens from overseas territories to the west of mainland France began
for the first time to vote without knowing the choices made by mainland voters.
We find that knowing the outcome of early voting decreases turnout by about 12
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percentage points in our preferred specification. We also find empirical support
for bandwagon voting in which later voters, if they participate, are more likely
to vote for the expected winner.
Our results suggest that when voters can access exit poll results during
an election voting behavior is significantly affected. These effects on voting
behavior (lower participation and a bandwagon effect) provide advantages to
candidates and political parties favored by early voters, which do not exist in
the absence of the information. If later voters differ from early voters in terms
of demographics and ideological preferences, then we would also expect such
information to have an effect on the types of public policies chosen by elected
officials as well. Candidates and political parties, moreover, have an incentive
to manipulate the timing of voting and the type and accuracy of information
revealed through exit polls. Concerns about the effects of exit polls on elections
as expressed by many government officials, candidates, and party leaders and
calls for restrictions on such information are thus strongly supported by our
results.
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